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Advocate General (‘AG’) Saugmandsgaard Øe recommends the European Court of Justice (‘ECJ’) to (i) rule that
the test included in the Bronner Judgment – including the indispensability requirement – should only be applied in
specific circumstances (i.e., in case of ‘refusals to make available’), and (ii) reject the introduction of the concept
of ‘implicit refusals to grant access’ (or similar terms such as ‘constructive refusals to grant access’). In this
article, we set out the reasoning adopted by the AG to substantiate his recommendation as well as our analysis of
the AG’s Opinion.
In addition, the Opinion provides the ECJ guidance in relation to the liability of parent undertakings for the behaviour
of their subsidiaries. We do not deal with this aspect of the Opinion.
1.The Parties
Slovak Telekom,  a.s.,  (‘ST’ )  is Slovakia’s incumbent telecommunications operator. ST is the largest
telecommunications operator and broadband provider in Slovakia (being the indirect successor of the public post
and telecommunications undertaking that ceased to exist in 1992). The legal monopoly it enjoyed on the Slovakian
telecommunications market came to an end in 2000. It offers a full range of data and voice services, and owns
and operates fixed copper and fibre optic networks as well as a mobile telecommunications network.
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Deutsche Telekom AG (‘DT’ )  is Germany’s incumbent telecommunications operator and Slovak Telekom’s
parent company. It is by revenue Europe’s largest telecommunications provider and holds substantial shares in
other telecom companies.
2.The facts
On 15 October 2014, the European Commission (‘Commission’) imposed a ne of EUR 38.8 million jointly and
severally on DT and ST, and a ne of EUR 31 million on DT, for abusing their dominant position on the Slovak
broadband services market (‘Decis ion’). The Commission found that ST (i) withheld information from alternative
operators about its network that was necessary for the unbundling of ST’s local loop, 1 (ii) reduced the scope of
ST’s obligations regarding unbundled local loops, (iii)  [1] set unfair terms and conditions in ST’s reference
unbundling offer with regard to collocation, quali cation, forecasting, repairs and bank guarantees; and (iv) applied
unfair tariffs which do not allow an equally e cient competitor relying on wholesale access to ST’s unbundled
loops to replicate the retail broadband services offered by ST without incurring a loss (‘margin squeeze’).
DT and ST appealed the Decision before the General Court (‘GC’). In its Judgments, the GC reduced the nes
imposed on DT and ST but upheld the ndings of the Commission. DT and ST appealed these Judgments before
the ECJ. In summary, both entities’ main substantive argument can be summarized as follows: to nd a margin
squeeze abusive, the conditions included in the Bronner Judgment have to be met, in particular the indispensability
requirement. [2] In their view, the Bronner test should be applied both in case of explicit and implicit refusals to
access. [3] The existence of the other practices (see i-iii above) was not contested by DT or ST before the GC.
3.The Opinion
In his Opinion, AG Saugmandsgaard Øe recommends the ECJ to rule that the legal test set out in the Bronner
Judgment – including the indispensability requirement – is only applicable in case of ‘refusals to make available’.
To support his recommendation, the AG demonstrates that extending the application of the Bronner test would be
both undesirable given the potential effects on the effectiveness of Article 102 TFEU (section 3.i), and incorrect
in light of the rationale underlying the Bronner Judgment (section 3.ii). In addition, the AG sets out why the ECJ
should reject the introduction of the ‘implicit refusals to access’ doctrine as not recognized in the ECJ’s case law
(section 3.iii).
Before starting his argumentation, AG Saugmandsgaard Øe recalls the speci c circumstances of the Bronner
case: “a refusal by a dominant undertaking to make infrastructure which it owns […] available to one or more
competing undertakings” (emphasis added). The AG qualifies such scenario as a ‘refusal to make available’.
-* 3.i. Undesirable given the impact on the effectiveness of Article 102 TFEU (paras. 61- 65)
The AG continues by emphasizing the high legal standard set by the ECJ in Bronner, qualifying Bronner as a ‘peak’
in the regulatory landscape of Article 102 TFEU. Consequently, extending the application of the Bronner criteria –
intended to only apply in exceptional circumstances – to other categories of abuses would negatively impact the
effectiveness of Article 102 TFEU.
According to the AG, any extension of the application of the Bronner test would lead to only ‘super abuses’ being
prohibited (i.e., abusive practices satisfying all conditions laid down in Bronner). For all types of abuses to which
the Bronner standard would be extended, the Commission, or private claimants, would have to prove the ful llment
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of cumulative criteria that were intended to only apply in exceptional circumstances. Vice versa, for all these type
of abuses, a dominant undertaking could avoid being caught by Article 102 TFEU by demonstrating that one of the
Bronner criteria is not fulfilled.
-*3.ii. Incorrect given the exceptional nature of the refusal to make available doctrine (para. 66-79 and 97-117)
The AG proceeds by recalling why the ECJ has systematically set a higher legal standard to assess the abusive
nature of ‘refusals to make available’ compared to other abusive practices relating to the terms of an agreement
(e.g., the setting of unfair prices, margin squeeze or other unfair contract terms).
According to the AG, the higher legal standard is justi ed as the remedy required to restore competition in case of
a ‘refusal to make available’ has a considerably more detrimental impact on an undertaking’s freedom to conduct
business. That is to say, to remedy ‘a refusal to make available’, a dominant undertaking will be obliged to
conclude an agreement. Imposing such an obligation entails a signi cantly further reaching restriction on the
freedom to conduct business than the remedy required to restore competition in case of abuses concerning the
terms of an agreement (e.g., price). Given this further reaching impact on an undertaking’s freedom to conduct
business, the Bronner Judgment correctly set a higher legal standard – requiring inter alia indispensability – to
assess the abusive nature of ‘refusals to make available’.
Referring to AG Jacobs’ Opinion in Bronner, [4] the AG indicates that such higher standard requiring indispensability
is in essence justi ed as it allows to correctly balance the following sets of interests (a fundamental rights and
free competition, and (b) short-term and long-term bene ts for competition and, ultimately, consumers. When a
remedy entails (a) a (more) serious restriction on an undertaking’s fundamental rights, and (b) potentially has a
negative impact on undertakings’ incentives to invest, a balance is found by imposing additional conditions on the
application of Article 102 TFEU.
Consequently, ST’s conduct is not subject to the indispensability test as it relates to the terms of an agreement
(and did not refuse access to infrastructure which it owns). This solution is in line with the TeliaSonera Judgment
in which the ECJ already clari ed that a margin squeeze, which does not constitute a ‘refusal to access’, can be
abusive when the input is not indispensable. [5]
-*3.iii. ‘Implicit refusals to access’ doctrine is not recognized in the ECJ’s case law
In addition, the AG strongly opposes the notion of an ‘implicit refusal to access’ or ‘categorical refusal to access’
as the ECJ has never applied the conditions laid down in Bronner, or any equivalent legal criterion, to unfair contract
terms.
The AG’s main criticism on the notion of an ‘implicit refusal to access’, on top of the above mentioned arguments,
is that the notion potentially has such an elastic scope that its adoption could stretch the Bronner-doctrine to apply
to every abuse of dominance-case. Any anticompetitive practice adopted by a dominant undertaking can indeed in
some way constitute an ‘implicit refusal to access’ since any disadvantage imposed by a dominant undertaking is
potentially liable to discourage potential customers from using the goods and services it offers. The AG illustrates
this by asking what threshold would be used to determine when an unfair price – which would be a perfect
example of an implicit refusal of access (if such a thing existed) – [6] becomes an implicit refusal of access, and
notes that this distinction would be even more difficult to make for conditions not relating to pricing.
4.Comment
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AG Saugmandsgaard Øe’s Opinion is an important reminder that the test included in the Bronner Judgment –
including the indispensability requirement – should only be applied in exceptional circumstances (i.e., in case of
‘refusals to make available’). As stressed by the AG: “the principle is that the conditions laid down in Bronner
are not applicable for the purpose of assessing the existence of an infringement of Article 102 TFEU.”
(emphasis added).
While it remains to be seen whether the ECJ will con rm the recommendation of the AG, we welcome the
approach suggested by the AG. In our view, the AG’s Opinion clearly clari es the following misinterpretations
existing after the TeliaSonera Judgment. [7]
Required remedy to restore competition is the decisive factor to determine applicable legal test
Referring to the rationale underlying the Bronner Judgment, the AG suggests the ECJ to rule that the determining
factor to decide whether the Bronner test is applicable is the nature of the remedy required to restore competition.
This interconnection between the remedy and applicable legal test is highlighted by the AG and forms the premise
of his argumentation.
According to the AG, the higher legal standard included in Bronner is justi ed because the remedy required in
‘refusals to make available’ cases – obliging an undertaking to contract – has a more far-reaching impact on an
undertaking’s freedom to conduct business than remedies required in other cases (e.g., being obliged to amend to
the terms of an agreement). Given this more far-reaching impact on an undertaking’s rights, a higher legal standard
requiring inter alia indispensability is justi ed as it allows to correctly balance the following sets of interests (a)
fundamental rights and free competition, and (b) short-term and long-term benefits for competition.
Such a ‘remedy-based approach’ also addresses the critique from some authors which have indicated that the
distinction between abuses related to ‘refusals to access’ and ‘the terms of the agreement’ seems to be less clear
than the distinction between ‘implicit’ and ‘explicit’ refusals as certain types of behaviour (e.g., tying or bundling)
could be classi ed as both refusals to access and a term of an agreement. [8] The AG’s Opinion demonstrates
that such categorical labelling of abuses is not required to assess the applicability of the Bronner criteria. The AG’s
Opinion clari es – referring to the rationale underlying the Bronner Judgment – that the applicable legal test is not
determined by the label applied to the abuse but by the nature of the remedy required to restore competition.
Who can do more, can do less?
Some authors imply, referring to the adage ‘who can do more, can do less’, that if there is no obligation to grant
access, undertakings are free to set the terms under which access is granted. That is to say, if an undertaking is
free to not provide access at all, it should be a fortiori free to set terms under which it grants access. In their view,
if the opposite were to be true, undertakings would be encouraged to refuse to grant access as the legal standard
for such refusals is higher than the one for potentially abusive terms. [9]
However, such reasoning goes against the ‘remedy-based approach’ as it does not take into account the reasons
underlying the higher legal standard applicable to ‘refusals to make available’. Given that the higher legal standard
is in essence justi ed by the need to balance the further-reaching impact an obligation to contract has on an
undertaking’s freedom to conduct business, extending this legal standard to cases where no such obligation can
be imposed would be unjusti ed. Accordingly, dominant undertakings without indispensable infrastructure have
the right to refuse access, which ows from their right to property. If they however do decide to voluntarily grant
access, they must do so without violating competition law.
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[1] As regards the supply of internet access, the local loop is the physical twisted metallic pair
circuit that connects the network termination point at the subscriber’s premises to the main
distribution frame or any other equivalent facility in the fixed public telephone network. Unbundledaccess to the local loop allows new entrants, usually called ‘alternative operators’, to use the existing
telecommunications infrastructure belonging to those incumbent operators in order to offer various
services to end users, in competition with the incumbent operators. Local loop unbundling was
organised at EU level, inter alia, by Regulation (EC) No 2887/2000 and Directive 2002/21/EC. In
essence, that regulatory framework required the operator ‘with significant market power’, as
identified by the national regulatory authority, to grant alternative operators unbundled access to its
local loop and to related services under transparent, fair and non-discriminatory conditions, and to
maintain an updated reference offer for such unbundled access.
[2] Case C–7/97, 26 November 1998, Oscar Bronner GmbH & Co. KG v Mediaprint Zeitungs-und Zeitschriftenverlag GmbH & Co. KG.
[3] ‘Implicit refusals’ are also referred to as ‘constructive refusals’.
[4] Opinion of AG Jacobs in Case C–7/97, Oscar Bronner GmbH & Co. KG v MediaprintZeitungs-und Zeitschriftenverlag GmbH & Co. KG.
[5] Case C–52/09, 17 February 2011, Konkurrensverket v TeliaSonera Sverige. See also C-
295/12, 10 July 2014, Telefónica and Telefónica de España v Commission.
[6] In its case law on unfair pricing, the ECJ did not use legal criteria equivalent to the conditions
laid down in Bronner (see for example Case 26/75, 13 November 1975, General MotorsContinental v Commission; Case 226/84, 11 November 1986, British Leyland v Commission;
Case 395/87, 13 July 1989, Ministère public v Jean-Louis Tournier; Case C-340/99, 17 May
2001, TNT Traco SpA v Poste Italiane SpA and Others; Case C-52/07, 11 December 2008, Kanal5 and TV 4 and Case C-385/07 P, 16 July 2009, Der Grüne Punkt – Duales System Deutschlandv Commission. More recently, the ECJ confirmed this approach by refraining from applying the
conditions laid down in Bronner in two Judgments concerning the pricing practices of copyright
collecting societies, although it may reasonably be presumed that their services were indispensable to
certain downstream activities (see Case C-351/12, 27 February 2014, OSA and Case C-177/2016,
14 September 2017, Autortiesību un komunicēšanās konsultāciju aģentūra – Latvijas Autoruapvienība.
[7] A Judgment which sparked a debate on similar points, see D. Geradin (2010), “Refusal to
supply and margin squeeze: A discussion of why the “Telefonica exceptions” are wrong”, TILEC
Discussion Paper, available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1762687 ; K. Coates, “The Estoppel
Abuse”, Oct 28, 2013, 21st Century Competition: Reflections on Modern Antitrust, available athttp://www.twentyfirstcenturycompetition.com/2013/10/the-estoppel-abuse/ .
[8] See Nicolas Petit, The EU Court of Justice AG Saugmandsgaard Øe issues opinion finding that
a firm without an indispensable infrastructure can nonetheless abuse a dominant position by way of
margin squeeze (Slovak Telekom / Deutsche Telekom), 9 September 2020, e-Competitions
September 2020, Art. N° 97618.
[9] Ibid. and Assimakis Komninos, Competition Stories: September & October 2020,
CONCURRENTIALISTE, (October 26, 2020).
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